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BUPFALO LAW REVIEW
ity granted must be as broad as the privilege. Hence, his testimony could not be
grounds for either citation or indictment. Although the Court did not specifically
hold §2447 unconstitutional, this decision will virtually vitiate any possible effect
of the statute.
Amendment of Indictment
There are two methods of indictment procedure in New York; the first and
older is a long form indictment,10 which has been in use since 1881. The second
method, authorizing a simplified indictment,20 was enacted in 1929. Included in
the chapter outlining the simplified indictment is a section permitting the indictment to be amended according to the proof, if the defendant cannot thereby be
prejudiced.2 1 The amendment may even add new counts to the indictment where
it appears that the new crimes to be charged relate to the transactions which form
22
the basis for the indictment.
In People v. Ercole,3 a long form indictment for larceny was returned which
failed to allege false or fraudulent representations as required by statute. 24 On trial,
and before proof of the larceny, an amendment of the indictment was permitted,
25
to add new counts which were in conformity with the larceny statute.
The majority of the Court of Appeals felt that the chapter on simplified indictments was meant to relate only to indictments found under that chapter
and could not be used to amend a long form indictment such as was used in the
instant case. Only the amendment sections existing independently of the simplified
indictment chapter 20 may be used to affect a long form indictment.
The dissent maintains that § 295-j is independent of the simplified indictment
chapter and applies to any indictment, basing this argument largely on dicta found
in previous rulings of the court.27 The stautory scheme does not seem to suppor;
this contention.
Automobiles: Junior Operator
In People v. Harms,28 defendant, a holder of a junior operator's license, was
19.
20.
21.

N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§273-292-a.
Id., §§295 (b)-295 (k).
Id., §295 (j).

22. Ibid.
23. 308 N. Y. 425, 126 N. E. 2d 543 (1955).
24. N. Y. PENAL LAW §1290-a.
25. Id., §1290.
26. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § §285, 293, 542.
27. People ex rel. Prince v. Brophy, 273 N. Y. 90, 6 N. E. 2d 109 (1937);
Peopie v. Miles, 289 N. Y. 360, 45 N. E. 2d 910 (1942); People ecx rel. Poulos v.
Mc Donnell, 302 N.Y. 89, 96 N. E. 2d 614 (1951).
28. 308 N. Y. 35, 123 N. E. 2d 627 (1954).
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driving home from a high school after a basketball game in which his school had
participated. He was arrested and convicted of operating a motor vehicle under a
junior operator's license "other than going to and from school, during the hour of
darkness (without being) accompanied by a duly licensed operator who is over
eighteen years of age."2 9 The defendant contended that at the time of arrest he was
coming "from school." He felt the word "school" as used in the statutory exception
included extra-curricular activities as well as formal school sessions. The Court, in
affirming the conviction, held that "the exception as to going to and from school
was added to allow a junior operator to drive an automobile during the hours of
darkness, if his journey was to or from school sessions. .. It would be quite an
extension of that idea to hold that such junior operator could, unaccompanied,
drive, at any hour of the night, so long as he was returning from a school function."
The dissent is grounded on the general rule that penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused"0 and "to say that the term 'school' means
only a regular session of school' is to construe this statute strictly against the
defendant for such a conclusion can be reached only by ignoring the numerous
broader meanings which the word 'school' admittedly has."
Public WYelfare Offenses
In People v. D. H. Ahrend Co.31 the Court was called upon to interpret the
phrase "knowingly permit,"32 as applied to the president of a corporation's failing
to comply with the provision of the Labor Law33 relating to prompt payment of
wages. The majority held that the defendant was actively engaged in corporate
affairs, and thus knowingly34 failed to prevent the non-payment of wages; nothing
more was required to establish his guilt. The dissent would have required proof
that defendant had knowledge that the employees were not going to be paid when
he permitted them to work for the corporation; since the evidence showed that
defendant could not possibly have known this, they felt he should have been
exculpated.
The rationale of the majority was predicated upon the difficulty of proving
29. N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAV, §§20, subd. 1, par. b; 70, subd. 1.
30. People v. Nelson, 153 N. Y. 90, 94, 46 N. E. 1040, 1041 (1897).

31. 308 N. Y. 112, 123 N. E. 2d 799 (1954).
32. ". . . the officers of any such corporation who knowingly permit the
corporation to . . . (fail) to pay the wages of any of its employees ... are guilty
of a misdemeanor .. ." N. Y. PENAL LAW §1272.
33. "Every . . . (employer) shall pay weekly to each employee the wages
earned to a day not more than six days prior to the date of such payment."
N. Y. LABOR LAW §196 (2).
34. "The term 'knowingly' imports a knowledge that the facts exist which
constitute the act or omission a crime, and does not require knowledge of the
unlawfullness of the act or omission." N. Y. PENAL LAW §3(4).

